Introduction
Democracy promotion in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) remains a central pillar of the foreign policy of both the European Union (EU) and the United States (US), despite the failure of 'democracy by imposition' in Iraq. A recent relative military success in fighting insurgents still leaves a problematic political reality where warlordism and a weak central government make democracy a difficult goal to achieve.
Despite the embedding of the Iraqi government's control, the growing numbers of actors who seem prepared to take part in politics according to democratic norms / rules of the game may yet be outflanked by extremists. The fragmentation of Shi'a and Sunni communities into numerous sectarian political organisations and the reluctance of many Sunnis to participate in formal politics mean that some eschew violence while others perpetrate violence on a daily basis. 1 In addition, external actors plough on with democracy promotion efforts even though there are still significant contradictions between the objectives of the policy and its instruments. 2 To a large extent, post-2003 American policy in Iraq has focused attention of both scholars and policymakers on the methods through which the EU attempts to export democracy in the MENA region, such as positive political engagement with authoritarian regimes, the promotion of economic reforms and the strengthening of civil society activism.
Rather than concentrating on the relations between the incumbent authoritarian regimes and the opposition in the relevant countries, and on the degree to which these relations are affected by EU efforts at promoting democracy, human rights and the rule of law (an outside-in approach), this collection of articles inverts the focus of such relationships and attempts to look at them 'inside-out'. 3 While some contributions to the Special Issue also emphasise the 'outside-in' axis, given that this continues to be analytically rewarding, the overarching thrust of this Special Issue is to provide some empirical substance for the claim that EU policy making is not unidirectional and is influenced by the perceptions and actions of its 'targets'. We thus focus on domestic political changes as they are happening at the time of writing (late-2008) on the ground in the MENA and how they link into what the EU is attempting to achieve in the region. Conceptually, the literature on democracy promotion takes it for granted that certain institutional structures are necessary to promote reform within existing institutions, in accordance with liberaldemocratic and market-capitalist 'guidelines' for good governance. Rather than merely looking from the outside at how democracy promotion policies shape reform in the context of authoritarian regimes or how regimes and opposition are induced toward a liberal democratic model, we invert the focus and look from the inside-out at how regimes and opposition groups can induce external actors to view and react to their situation as a viable exception to their preferred practices. Our reference to MENA countries as an 'exception' denotes, on the one hand, exception at a practical level where regimes rule over populations mainly unversed in democratic politics and, on the other hand, exception at a conceptual level where Islamists who accept democratic procedures aim to build a significantly different type of nation-state, which might challenge what European policy-makers would consider to be democratically acceptable (see Volpi in this Special Issue). Finally, we discuss the self-representation of the EU and its (lack of a) clear regional role (see Pace in this Special Issue).
The combination of strong regimes in weak states 4 and the reluctance of the EU to approach popular Islamist opposition groups in the MENA region creates a situation which -from an EU perspective -entails a very limited range of political options. Thus, while the EU promotes a liberal-democratic and capitalist type of governance that reflects its own experience and its own interests, it is also willing to compromise on what can be achieved in the region, especially in a context where MENA regimes and some secular opposition actors influence how the EU conceives both political change and, more importantly, stability. Thus, this Special Issue examines how MENA ruling elites encourage the EU to look at them as a 'special case' or as an exception in terms of the EU's preferred practices built around the notions of democratic accountability and human rights. Similarly, opposition actors, be they secular or Islamist, are not only influenced by the ways that the EU seeks to export its preferred norms, but also may contribute to the EU's preferred policies by virtue of their ideologies and policy positions. It follows that secular opposition parties and civil society movements tend to present themselves as the only genuine 'democratic' actors in the region in order to gain benefits from a privileged relationship with the EU and organise their political activities around the necessity of satisfying the requirements of this privileged relationship. This behaviour tends however to marginalise them in the domestic political game, as the wider population may not subscribe either to their tactics or proposed policies. 5 In concerns at the heart of EU external policy-making. 6 In this Special Issue, we assume such a mixture and examine in some detail how EU policy-making processes are informed by the feedback effects that the targeted domestic actors in the MENA generate.
In other words, by highlighting the current reality on the ground in MENA, this Special
Issue gives prominence to how local actors' actions themselves influence EU democracy promotion policies in the region.
Some claim that the whole idea of focusing on the EU's democracy promotion efforts is no longer enlightening. They suggest that the explicit focus on democracy promotion is in itself preventing new insights. 7 Schlumberger, for example, suggests that instead we should focus on the nature of MENA states, in particular, on the inter-relationship between rents, rent seeking, and the prospects for economic and political transformation to a market economy and democratic governance:
For current research, the key challenge is to increase our knowledge of the causes for Arab authoritarianism. This topic has only recently become a core area of research on Middle East politics. Donor strategies, in their turn, should follow research and be ready to enter the "post-democratization era", take into account these causes and develop new ideas in order to explicitly address them (...) Such ideas need to start from present authoritarian conditions in recipient countries rather than from ideal-type images of liberal democracies. 8 But to our mind such claims still leave a research vacuum which has thus far not been filled. In fact the underlying assumption of these critics is that a comprehensive, academic description and analysis of democracy promotion initiatives by the EU in the Mediterranean region and/or the wider Middle East has been achieved and nothing more needs to be said. While we agree on the focus on conditions in MENA countries, we endeavour to add MENA actors and their actions to the context. The contention here is that, in light of both scholarly and policy-making developments, a new form of analysis is necessary, particularly when the focus shifts from evaluating the policies of the EU to analysing how the targeted actors (MENA regimes and opposition actors) themselves react to and influence how such policies are designed and implemented.
From a scholarly point of view, the wider literature on democratization has now accepted the significant role that external actors can have in influencing processes of regime change, which were previously believed to be solely domestic affairs. 9 This means that more refined, theoretical tools can now be employed to understand how specific EU policies and actors affect the transitional game within targeted countries. This allows scholarship to move beyond discussions of the EU's attempts at exporting the model of liberal democracy to the MENA and seek instead an approach where the focus is on domestic actors and their possible contributions in shaping the perceptions of the region of external actors. Previous discussions largely focused on the notorious failures of progress in democratization processes in the region and on the internal contradictions that characterize EU policy-making. 10 From a policy-making point of view, much has changed since previous systematic analyses of the EU's relationship with the MENA, 11 because of the extremely important impact of the US-led 'war on terror', which has reconfigured both strategies and policy tools of action and led to the rise of security and stability goals. Although this is far from being empirically proven 12 , there is now, among US policy makers in particular, the almost unquestioned assumption that democracy will contribute to reduce, if not eliminate, political violence. 13 The type of democracy that is envisaged by external actors for the MENA is one that, over time, will come to reflect the institutions and the values upon which Western democracies are built. Thus, while democracy might be an essentially contested concept in theoretical terms, at the practical and policy-making level a blueprint for what democracy should look like does exist and it is not surprising that it mirrors the experience and the institutions of the leading Western powers. Western-style democracy is pursued as an objective partly because of its presumed beneficial international repercussions, associated with 'democratic peace theory'. We could hypothesize that the EU promotes democracy with vigour in the MENA region because it believes it to be crucial to international stability and security.
14 It might be logical to assume that EU democracy promotion policies would be strengthened and made more coherent and effective after 9/11. This, however, does not seem to be the case, as contradictions in EU policy regarding democracy promotion in the MENA region are still significant. This would seem to point to an understanding of the EU as a rationalistic and realist actor rather than a normative one. Therefore, the apparent robustness of authoritarianism in the MENA, which, among other things, leads to institutionalisation of strong groups of elites in power 18 -and is a central paradox of weak MENA states 19 -becomes important as part of our analysis in this Special Issue. In particular, as explained earlier, this can enable regimes to persuade the EU to view their situation as an 'exception'. The region has a remarkable success rate of incumbent autocratic regimes remaining in power for long periods, in spite of sometimes significant challenges to their rule and widespread lack of popular legitimacy.
The resilience and durability of the regimes in the MENA can be explained by various factors, as recent research has shown. 20 If we look at the many different attempts to explain authoritarian ability for survival or 'persistence', they span from orientalist/psychologically familiar assumptions about a special resistance of the Islamic mind, 21 via an extreme degree of state repression attached to Mediterranean regimes, to macro-sociological explanations taking their point of departure in the ability of the regimes to include or co-opt different forms of opposition groups. 22 Furthermore, there are also explanations based on assumptions that MENA political elites manage to stay in power by 'buying off' possible contestants to local hegemony. A distribution of significant amounts of symbolic or material resources to ethnic, religious or politically defined minorities (or majorities), makes it possible for often illegitimate regimes to survive, resisting demands for democracy and good governance from both inside and outside. In addition, they are able to convince external actors, including the EU, of the particular and exceptional circumstances on the ground.
Focusing on political issues in the MENA highlights how the supposedly normative, long-running EU push for democracy in the MENA is at best a very slow work in progress, and at worst democracy is not advancing but retreating. Disappointment in this regard is in part due to inherent paradoxes and contradictions in the making of a policy with no clear, defined vision due to internal institutional problems of the EU structure itself. However, as this Special Issue highlights, the production of relevant policies and norms is not solely the realm of the EU, as the design and implementation of democracy promotion strategies is clearly influenced by the way the targeted actors react to them and transform them. This Special Issue is therefore specifically concerned with outlining how authoritarian MENA regimes and opposition actors induce external actors, and specifically the EU, to perceive and react to their respective situation. This approach marks a novel contribution to the study of democracy promotion, while permitting, at the same time, an examination of how the EU represents itself in the region and how it conceives its role. Some of the past critiques of EU democracy promotion strategies in the region tended to concentrate their attention on the tools, resources and discourse of the EU in an attempt to explain the gap between the normative rhetoric and the disappointing reality. 23 Other critiques came from those scholars subscribing to a more realist interpretation of EU external policy-making. 24 What both approaches have in common is an exclusive focus on the EU as the 'leading agency or actor' in this process.
This Special Issue, on the contrary, attempts to analyse what the EU does in the region in light of what the targeted actors hope to achieve and how they utilise EU resources in order to achieve their objectives. These factors are an important insight into how the EU formulates and implements policies because it is only through a thorough understanding of the complexities of individual domestic political arrangements in each MENA country that we can have a clearer theoretical picture of EU policy-making.
An Agenda for Inquiry
The collection of articles in the Special Issue contains three separate but interconnected sections. The first section is informed by the academic debate about the current state of democratization studies. It seeks to frame conceptual arguments on the theme of EU democracy promotion and how this policy is read and affected by various political agents in the MENA. Thus, the first section deals with normative and discursive dimensions of EU democracy promotion efforts, how they influence domestic actors and, importantly, how they are influenced by them. This is a crucial aspect in explaining the so-far failed democracy promotion efforts of the EU in the region. She also points to a tension between the EU's objectives of promoting democracy on the one hand and seeking to ensure security on the other. This refers to security in the economic sense, meaning oil and gas supplies, and, in the political sense, it implies relations with authoritarian regimes rather than opposition groups, including Islamist actors. Taking the relationship between Israel and the Palestinians as a case study, Pace discusses the paradoxes and contradictions inherent in EU efforts to promote democratic transformation. She concludes that the EU, by focusing primarily on external democracy promotion in the Mediterranean region, creates the impression that the concept of democracy in itself is external to the region. This marginalises the domestic production of democratic norms because they do not seem to fit with European conceptualisations of how a polity should be governed or organised.
Case Studies I: the Mashrek
The sections consisting of case-studies begin with Are Hovdenak's study on Palestine. 
Conclusion
It is our claim that by taking an inside-out approach in our case studies, as well as seeking to combine realist and normative approaches, we can usefully generate new insights into relations between the EU and other external actors and authoritarian regimes in the MENA. We also argue that in choosing not to interact or engage with other actors in the MENA, the EU holds a very limited and blurred understanding of the specificities of each country in the region as well as of the region as a whole. By focusing in particular on
Islamist groups in the MENA, the contributors in this Special Issue are not claiming that these groups are necessarily 'democratic': no such group has so far been given the opportunity to take part in a 'liberal political system'. Attempting to understand the exact political nature of Islamist groups without taking into account their surrounding institutional environments does not usefully help us understand how they might operate in democratic political systems. 27 Instead, we have highlighted how internal actors in the MENA have read the EU's efforts at promoting its particular model of liberal democracy and how they, in turn, have attempted to respond to the EU. We have also attempted to highlight how marginal groups, including Islamist movements in the MENA, are characterised by their own agency and are not merely subject to EU programmes and policies. Moreover, such groups can help shape what the EU attempts to do in the region.
We have also emphasised how these agents play a specific political role in relation to the 
